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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3658
___________
MICHAEL EUGENE BOONE,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN RONNIE HOLT, U.S.P. Canaan
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-01531)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect
and for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 12, 2013
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2013 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM

Appellant Michael Eugene Boone is an inmate confined at the United States
Penitentiary at Canaan (“USP-Canaan”) in Waymart, Pennsylvania. After a hearing
before the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”), Boone was found guilty of a Code 113
violation, Possession of Any Narcotics Not Prescribed for the Individual by Medical
Staff. The DHO sanctioned Boone with forfeiture of 1,000 days of good conduct time,
sixty days of disciplinary segregation, three years loss of visiting privileges followed by
three years of restricted visiting, one year loss of commissary privileges, thirty days
impounding of personal property (excluding religious and legal materials), and two years
loss of telephone and email privileges. Boone’s administrative appeals were
unsuccessful.
In 2011, Boone filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He claimed
that the evidence used to determine his guilt was insufficient, and that he was denied due
process at the disciplinary hearing because the confidential informants relied upon by the
DHO did not have an established history of reliability. He sought assorted relief,
including restoration of his good conduct time and prison job, removal of sanctions, and
removal of the incident report from his record. The Respondent responded to the
petition, to which Boone filed a reply. After reviewing the parties’ submissions,
including in camera review of documents submitted by the Respondent under seal, the
District Court denied the habeas petition.
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This appeal followed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). We review the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de
novo, but we review factual findings for clear error. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); Vega, 493 F.3d
at 317 n.4. Thus, when an inmate’s disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good
time credits, the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges; (2) an opportunity to summon witnesses and present documentary evidence; and
(3) the factfinder’s written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff,
418 U.S. at 563-67). The disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” in
the record. See id. at 455.
There appears to be no dispute that Boone received the required notice of charges,
the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence, and the factfinder’s statement, as
described above. Boone’s arguments focused instead on the sufficiency of evidence, and
on the DHO’s reliance on a confidential informant whose reliability had not been
established. When a disciplinary decision relies upon statements from confidential
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The appeal initially appeared to be untimely. On our remand, the District Court granted
relief on Boone’s motion to reopen the time for appeal. See Federal Rule of Appellate
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informants, minimum due process requires that the record contain (1) some underlying
factual information from which the tribunal can reasonably conclude that the informant
was credible or his information reliable; and (2) the informant’s statement in factual
language, establishing by its specificity that the informant spoke with personal
knowledge of the matters. See Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 502 (3d Cir. 1981), rev’d
on other grounds, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). Under Helms, “the record”
includes both the evidence presented during the disciplinary hearing and the investigative
report. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1987).
Upon our in camera review of the record, we concur with the District Court’s
denial of Boone’s habeas petition. At the outset, we note that the DHO’s findings did not
rest solely upon a confidential informant statement Rather, the DHO’s decision relied
upon corroborating statements of other inmates in a Special Investigative Services
(“SIS”) investigation report, specifically naming Boone’s involvement in distributing
heroin at USP-Canaan. See Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that corroborating testimony can establish the reliability of confidential informant
testimony). Each inmate’s statement provided factual specifics conveying personal
knowledge of Boone’s heroin distribution activity at USP-Canaan. Thus, we conclude
that Boone received the minimum due process required under Helms, and that the DHO’s
decision meets the “some evidence” standard of support. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56

Procedure 4(a)(6); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 223-24
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(we review whether there is “any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board”).
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

(3d Cir. 2007) (discussing “separate document” requirement and entry of judgment).
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